英语翻译Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation in Performance-Vested Equity GrantsAbstract:Using data from FTSE 350 firms,we examine the factors influencing the explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants.We provide evidence on the use of RPE either to improve incentives by removing common risk or by linking greater vesting percentages to higher relative performance rankings.We also investigate whether R
英语翻译
Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation in Performance-Vested Equity Grants
Abstract:
Using data from FTSE 350 firms,we examine the factors influencing the explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants.We provide evidence on the use of RPE either to improve incentives by removing common risk or by linking greater vesting percentages to higher relative performance rankings.We also investigate whether RPE is used to opportunistically increase vesting and/or placate external parties calling for its use.We find that specific RPE conditions vary depending upon whether the plan is used to remove common risk or to promote superior relative performance.However,we find no evidence that greater external monitoring by institutional investors or others is associated with specific RPE performance conditions.The relative performance conditions are binding in most RPE plans,with nearly two-thirds of the grants vesting only partially or not vesting at all.However,we find no evidence that vesting percentages are higher in RPE plans than in non-RPE plans,and no evidence that RPE is used opportunistically to increase vesting and compensation.
Keywords:Executive compensation,relative performance evaluation,equity grants
如果能帮忙翻译整篇文章,一定重重加分
我觉得这贴放在英语版面保证半小时内会有很多热心人给你翻译~我翻得有点不太顺,我对股票授权和业绩这方面的英语不是很熟悉.希望能帮上你的忙吧!
Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation in Performance-Vested Equity Grants
绩效授予股权中的外在相对业绩评估
Abstract:
概要：
Using data from FTSE 350 firms,we examine the factors influencing the explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants.We provide evidence on the use of RPE either to improve incentives by removing common risk or by linking greater vesting percentages to higher relative performance rankings.We also investigate whether RPE is used to opportunistically increase vesting and/or placate external parties calling for its use.
根据英国富时350指数成分股公司的数据,我们对绩效授予股权中,影响外在相对业绩评估（RPE）的因素作了调查和研究.运用相对业绩评估,我们研究证据表明,通过消除风险或者将授权百分比和相关业绩排名挂钩,排名越高,百分比越高,这两个途径可以刺激鼓励员工.我们也调查了相对业绩评估是否仅仅是偶然的延长了授权期和/抑或只是安抚外部各方.
We find that specific RPE conditions vary depending upon whether the plan is used to remove common risk or to promote superior relative performance.However,we find no evidence that greater external monitoring by institutional investors or others is associated with specific RPE performance conditions.The relative performance conditions are binding in most RPE plans,with nearly two-thirds of the grants vesting only partially or not vesting at all.However,we find no evidence that vesting percentages are higher in RPE plans than in non-RPE plans,and no evidence that RPE is used opportunistically to increase vesting and compensation.
我们发现特定相关业绩评估的变化取决于这个计划是用于消除风险还是促进高层相关业绩.但并无证据证明,机构投资者外部监督和特定业绩相关评估有关.相关业绩和多数的RPE计划是相互绑定的,有近三分之二授予部分期权或者完全不授予期权.但并无证据表明RPE计划中的授予百分比比非PRE计划中的高,亦无证据表明PRE偶然会延长授予期和增加赔偿.
（有2个地方不确定是不是这么翻译：
有近三分之二授予部分期权或者完全不授予期权
PRE偶然会延长授予期和增加赔偿）
Keywords:Executive compensation,relative performance evaluation,equity grants
关键词：行政赔偿,相关业绩评估,股权赠予